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ABSTRACT 
Ugur Celikyurt: Venture Capitalists In Mature Public Firms 
(Under the direction of Anil Shivdasani) 
 
By using an original hand-collected data on the professional backgrounds of board members 
of S&P companies, this paper presents evidence on the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in 
mature public companies long time after their initial public offering (IPO). We find that 
30.5% of S&P firms, which have gone public almost 20 years ago, have at least one VC 
director on their board, suggesting that VCs’ governance role extends from newly public 
firms to mature public firms. VCs’ presence as board members is not only limited to public 
firms which were VC-backed at the time of their IPO. 34.8% of the firms with VC directors 
were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. We find that firms with VC directors on board 
exhibit greater research and development (R&D) and innovation activity measured by their 
patenting output. There is also a significant difference in the acquisition activity of firms with 
VC directors and firms with no VC directors. Firms with VC directors acquire smaller, more 
R&D intensive and VC-backed targets. They also exhibit a greater amount of corporate 
venture capital (CVC) investment and form a greater number of joint ventures and strategic 
alliances with VC-backed firms than firms with no VC directors. Overall, this paper provides 
the first piece of evidence that, in addition to their role as providers of finance, monitoring 
and advice for small private firms, VCs also play a significant role in mature public firms, 
especially in promoting the R&D and innovation activity in such firms.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A broad literature documents the importance of venture capitalists (VCs) in the 
creation and growth of small and private entrepreneurial firms. VCs help their portfolio 
companies by providing advice and support (Gompers (1995) and Lerner (1995)), help with 
the professionalization of the management team (Hellmann and Puri (2002)), exercise 
monitoring and corporate governance (Hsu (2004), Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and (2004), 
Lerner (1994), Lindsey (2008)), and foster innovation (Hellmann and Puri (2000) and 
Kortum and Lerner (2000)).  
A more recent literature addresses VCs’ role in public companies. Barry, Muscarella, 
Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990) find that IPO firms with higher quality VCs are less 
underpriced than IPO firms with lower quality VCs and argue this is due to monitoring and 
certification roles of higher quality VCs. Megginson and Weiss (1991) also document a 
negative relation between VC-backing and underpricing, further confirming the monitoring 
and certification roles of VCs. Baker and Gompers (2003) analyze the effect of VCs on board 
size and composition at the time of the IPO, and show that VC-backed companies have better 
performing boards of directors, and these boards are related to better long-run performance 
after the IPO. Brav and Gompers (1997) analyze the post-IPO performance of IPO firms and 
show that VC-backed firms do not tend to have negative performance after their IPOs. They 
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also find that small firms with market capitalizations below $50 million with no VC-backing 
have negative post-IPO performance. Hochberg (2006) studies the role of VC-backing on the 
corporate governance of the firm right after its IPO and finds that, compared to nonVC-
backed firms, VC-backed firms have lower earnings management, experience a higher 
wealth effect on the announcement of poison pills, and have more independent boards of 
directors, audit committees and compensation committees. Although these papers focus on 
different dimensions of VCs’ involvement in public companies, they all have one feature in 
common: They analyze the effects of VC involvement for only newly public firms around the 
IPO date. There has been no evidence so far on the presence of VCs in mature public 
companies beyond their IPO stage. This dissertation provides the first piece of evidence that, 
in addition to their role as providers of finance and advice for small and private firms, VCs 
play a significant role for mature public firms, even long time after the IPO stage, especially 
in promoting research and development (R&D) and innovation activity. Our results show that 
firms with VC directors acquire more R&D intensive private firms, participate in a greater 
amount of corporate venture capital (CVC) investment in external start-ups, and form a 
greater number of joint ventures (JVs) and strategic alliances with VC-backed firms, 
providing a potential explanation for why such firms appear more innovative and R&D 
intensive than firms without VC directors.  
Using an original hand-collected dataset on the professional backgrounds of board 
members of S&P500, S&P MidCap and S&P SmallCap companies, we classify directors into 
VC directors and non-VC directors based on whether a director has worked as a VC before 
his appointment as a director in a public firm. We find that 30.5% of the firms in our sample 
have at least one VC director on their board in the period from 1998 to 2006. Although firms 
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which were VC-backed at the time of their IPO are more likely to have VCs on their board 
long time after going public, 34.8% of firms in our sample with VCs on board were not VC-
backed at the time of their IPO.  
To understand the mechanism through which VCs get appointed to the boards of 
mature public firms, we analyze a number of such firms in detail around the time of VC 
appointments as board members. The anecdotal evidence we find reveals an interesting 
pattern. It appears that one of the main channels through which mature public firms gain VC 
directors on their board is due to their acquisitions of VC-backed firms. As an example, 
consider the Andrew Corporation. This firm specializes in the design, manufacture and 
supply of communications systems as a public firm since its IPO in 1980. In 2002, it acquired 
the Celiant Corporation. Celiant was created in 2001 as an independent joint venture of Bell 
Labs and Lucent Technologies with the VC funding from Pequot Capital. With the VC 
investment, Gerald A. Poch, a managing director at Pequot became the chairman and a 
member of the board of Celiant. After Celiant was acquired by Andrew in 2002, Pequot 
became an investor in Andrew, and Gerald A. Poch joined Andrew's board of directors.1 
Consistent with this example, our empirical test shows that a mature public firm is more 
likely to obtain a VC director on its board if this firm acquires a VC-backed target firm.2  
Compared to firms with no VC directors, we find that firms with VC directors have 
more independent boards. VC directors are younger, more independent and less likely to be 
                                                          
1In the press release of Andrew Corp. on Feb 19, 2002, Mr. Poch said: "Strategically, we believe this merger 
will bring value to all parties and create new opportunities for Andrew to expand its reach within the wireless 
market. We are excited about being a long term investor in and advisor to Andrew." 
2Another main channel through which mature public firms gain VC directors on their boards is simply the 
appointment of the VC directors to the board without their VC firm taking an equity ownership in these mature 
public firms. In these cases, the appointed VC directors’ entrepreneurial experience is cited as the most 
important reason to elect them to the boards. 
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insiders, and hold a lower percentage of outstanding shares than non-VC directors. 
Furthermore, VC directors serve more on the audit, compensation, nominating and corporate 
governance committees than non-VC directors. 
Firms with VC directors on board have significantly higher market-to-book ratios 
than firms without VC directors on board. The positive relation between the market-to-book 
ratio and the presence of VCs on boards becomes stronger as the number of VC directors on 
board increases. We also find that firms with VC directors on board exhibit greater R&D and 
innovation output in terms of their patenting activity than firms without VC directors. In 
addition, the amount of R&D outlays of a firm with VC directors increases monotonically in 
the number of VCs on board. In recent work, Lerner, Sorensen and Stromberg (2008) analyze 
the patenting activity of private firms that received private equity and show that private 
equity-backed firms have no decline in their patenting activity after they go private in an 
LBO. Our results on patenting activity of firms with VC directors complement their results 
by showing that the presence of VC directors is positively related to the number of patents 
obtained by our sample of public firms.  
In addition to the differences in R&D outlays and patenting activity, we also 
document significant differences in the acquisition activity of firms with VC directors and 
firms without VC directors. As mentioned before, mature public firms are more likely to gain 
VC directors on their board as they acquire more VC-backed targets. It turns out that after 
gaining a VC director on their boards, these firms continue to exhibit a different acquisition 
behavior than firms with no VC directors. More specifically, they undertake a lower amount 
of acquisition activity than firms without VC directors. Furthermore, their acquisition targets 
are more likely to be smaller, private, more R&D intensive and VC-backed than acquisition 
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targets of firms with no VC directors. This finding suggests that firms with VC directors 
pursue acquisitions with a focus on their innovation output by acquiring R&D intensive firms 
and VC-backed firms. These firms also conduct less diversifying acquisitions than firms with 
no VC directors. Interestingly, firms with VC directors are more likely to acquire target firms 
which have VC directors on their board as well, suggesting that VCs may play a role in 
facilitating the acquisition of firms with VC involvement. An alternative explanation for this 
result could be that, as analyzed in Gompers and Xuan (2008), having a VC director in both 
firms may facilitate a merger between these two firms by reducing the asymmetric 
information about the values of these firms. 
We also find that firms with VC directors engage in a greater amount of corporate 
venture capital (CVC) investment, where they acquire minority stakes in external 
entrepreneurial start-ups, compared to firms with no VC directors. Furthermore, they form a 
greater number of joint ventures with other VC-backed firms. Hence, our study suggests that 
having VC directors on board contributes to the R&D and innovation output of the firm by 
increasing the firm’s investment in CVC and by facilitating strategic partnerships with other 
entrepreneurial firms.  
Overall, this dissertation provides the first piece of evidence that VCs’ role in 
financing and promoting innovation and entrepreneurial activity is not limited to small 
private firms only. VCs also serve on the boards of mature public firms and affect their R&D 
and innovation activity as well as their acquisitions. Our results suggest that mature public 
firms with VC directors have a greater focus on internal growth through R&D and innovation 
activity than firms with no VC directors. They also prefer to undertake a lower amount of 
acquisition activity, and in their acquisitions, they are more likely to acquire private, R&D 
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intensive and VC-backed firms, and firms with VC directors on their board. Finally, even 
though firms with VC directors conduct a lower amount of acquisitions, they exhibit a 
greater amount of CVC investment and form a greater number of strategic relationships with 
VC-backed firms than firms without VC directors. Existing research on CVC (Chesbrough 
(2002), Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) and (2006)) shows that CVC investment and strategic 
alliances, through which established firms undertake minority investments in small 
entrepreneurial start-ups, represent an important source of innovation for mature firms. 
Hence, our finding that firms with VC directors are more R&D and innovation intensive than 
firms with no VC directors could be linked to their greater level of investment in CVC and 
strategic alliances.  
Finally, our study is related to the recent literature which investigates the presence of 
different types of directors on corporate boards such as bankers, CEOs, and women. We 
contribute to this literature by showing the perhaps surprising prevalence of VC directors in 
mature public firms and extending the well-established governance role of VCs in small 
private firms to that in mature public firms. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample, 
and Section 3 presents the descriptive statistics for board, director and firm characteristics. In 
Section 4, we analyze how VC directors get appointed to the boards of mature public firms in 
our sample. The patenting activity and the acquisition activity of our sample of firms are 
analyzed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 investigates the R&D and patenting 
output, and acquisition, joint venture and strategic alliance activity of our sample of firms in 
a multivariate setting. Section 8 concludes. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
DATA 
Our director data comes from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). This 
database is of annual frequency and covers directors of S&P 500, S&P MidCap and S&P 
SmallCap firms starting from 1996. The IRRC Directors database provides detailed 
information on the structure and practices of the boards of directors and also includes 
individual information for each director, such as their primary employment, the committees 
they serve on, their board affiliation, shares held and total voting power. Since IRRC starts to 
collect detailed data on the primary employment of board members from 1998 on, our 
sample covers public U.S. companies from 1998 to 2006.  
There are a total of 2,325 unique firms and 21,888 unique directors covered in IRRC 
database from 1998 to 2006. We exclude utility companies and financial companies from our 
sample since they operate in highly regulated industries. This restriction leaves us with a 
final sample of 1,839 firms and 16,911 directors, forming a panel dataset over nine years.1 
We classify firms in the sample into two groups based on whether they have directors 
on board, who are partners or executives at venture capital (VC) firms (denoted by VC 
directors), or not. In order to identify the VC directors, we employ a two-step search as 
follows: In the first step, we search for keywords, which might define a VC firm, in four 
                                                          
1This corresponds to 10,118 firm-years and 91,092 director-years. 
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different data items provided by IRRC for each individual director.2 These data items are 
primary company name, primary employment category, other employment title and type of 
services. If at least one of these keywords is available in any of these data items, we record 
that director as a possible candidate for being an executive or a partner in a VC firm, i.e. a 
VC director, and his primary company as a possible candidate for being a VC firm. Using 
this initial search procedure, we were able to identify 4,828 firms as possible VC firms. In 
the second step, we hand-collect biographical information from proxy statements on those 
board members, who were identified as possible VC directors in the first step. Specifically, 
we check whether the primary companies they work for are indeed VC firms, and whether 
these directors are partners or executives at these VC firms. Using this second search 
procedure, we identified a total of 672 primary companies that are VC firms.3 We denote 
those directors who are partners or executives of a VC firm as VC directors and the others as 
non-VC directors. Firms with at least one VC director on board are classified as firms with 
VC directors, whereas firms with no VC director on board are classified as firms with no VC 
directors. 
Figure 1 shows the number of firms in our sample over the years, split into four 
groups according to the number of VC directors they have on their boards. In each year from 
1998 to 2006, on average 30.5% of the firms have at least one VC director on board.  
                                                          
2The keywords that we search for are: Venture, capital, partner, fund, investor, angel, private, equity, finance, 
financial, and management. 
3This hand-collected data procedure reveals many small VC firms that cannot be identified using VentureXpert 
database. More specifically, 192 of the 672 primary companies that we identified as VC firms (i.e. 28.6% of the 
VC firms) do not have a record in the VentureXpert database since they are small firms. 
CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We first investigate whether characteristics of the firms that have VC directors on 
their board are different from characteristics of the firms that do not have VC directors on 
their board. Table 1 presents the comparisons of firm, board and director characteristics 
between firms with VC directors and firms with no VC directors. 
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the board characteristics for our 
sample of public firms. Out of 10,118 firm-year observations, 3,084 of them (i.e. 30.48%) 
involve firms with VC directors on board and the remaining 7,034 (i.e. 69.52%) involve 
firms with no VC directors on board. Both types of firms have almost the same board size 
with the average board size being nine. For firms with VC directors, the average number of 
VC directors on board is 1.35, corresponding to 16.09% of the board size. Compared to firms 
with no VC directors, firms with VC directors have, on average, more independent boards 
with a lower percentage of inside directors (who are employees of the firms whose board 
they serve on) and a lower percentage of linked directors (who are directors having some sort 
of family or business ties to the firms whose board they serve on).  
Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics for director characteristics. VC 
directors are on average more independent and less likely to be insiders than non-VC 
directors. They are younger, and they hold a lower percentage of outstanding shares than 
non-VC directors. 
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Panel C of Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the committee membership 
characteristics of directors. We assign dummy variables taking the value of one if a director 
serves on the specified committee or is the chair of the specified committee and zero 
otherwise. We find that VC directors serve more on the audit, compensation, nominating and 
corporate governance committees, and they also chair more committees than non-VC 
directors. This finding is consistent with Hochberg (2008), which also documents that VCs 
serve on a greater number of committees in newly public firms. 
In Panel D of Table 1, we report the descriptive statistics for the public firms in our 
sample. The financial data for our sample of firms comes from Compustat database. Firms 
with VC directors are on average younger, and they have been public for a shorter time 
period than firms with no VC directors.1 However, even if they are comparatively younger, a 
typical firm with VC directors is 25.38 years old and has been public for almost 20 years. 
The average market value of assets of firms with VC directors turns out to be $13,439.6 
million compared to $10,532.1 million for firms with no VC directors, the difference being 
statistically significant.2  
In Panel D of Table 1, we also examine whether firms with VC directors were VC-
backed at the time of their IPO. We define a dummy variable which is equal to one for firms 
which were VC-backed at the time of their IPO, and zero otherwise.3 The mean of this 
dummy variable is 0.65 for firms with VC directors and 0.32 for firms with no VC directors,  
                                                          
1The founding dates are obtained from Jay R. Ritter’s website, and the IPO dates come from SDC’s New Issues 
database starting from 1970 on. For firms that went public before 1970, we take the first listing date in CRSP as 
the IPO date.  
2The market value of assets is defined as total assets minus total equity plus market capitalization given by the 
number of shares outstanding times the share price. 
3The data about whether firms were VC-backed at the time of their IPO comes from SDC’s New Issues 
database and is reported in SDC starting from year 1970 on. 
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indicating that a higher percentage of firms with VC directors were VC-backed at the time of 
their IPO compared to firms with no VC directors. We further find that 63.1% of the firms in 
our sample which were VC-backed at the time of their IPO have a VC director on board in at 
least one of the years from 1998 to 2006, whereas this percentage is 26.9% for firms which 
were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. The correlation coefficient between being VC-
backed at the time of the IPO and having a VC director on the board after the IPO turns out 
to be 0.36 and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Panel D of Table 1 also shows that firms with VC directors have higher Tobin’s Q, 
and greater research and development (R&D) expenditures, both in dollar terms and as a 
percentage of the firm’s market value, compared to firms with no VC directors. The level of 
capital expenditures (CAPEX), however, is lower for firms with VC directors. Figure 2 
shows how Tobin’s Q, R&D and CAPEX (both given as a percentage of the market value of 
the firm) change depending on the number of VC directors on board. We find that Tobin’s Q 
and R&D increase monotonically with the number of VC directors on board, whereas 
CAPEX decreases monotonically with the number of VC directors on board. These results 
suggest that firms with VC directors are more research oriented and have more growth 
prospects.   
 
CHAPTER 4 
APPOINTMENTS OF VC DIRECTORS 
Even if the comparison of the firm characteristics between firms with VC directors 
and firms with no VC directors presented in Table 1 provides information about some major 
differences in these firms, this comparison on its own does not provide an answer about 
whether these characteristics play a role in determining the VC director appointments to the 
boards of the mature public firms in our sample. It is therefore necessary to analyze the VC 
director appointments in a multivariate setting, where we can assess the effect of each 
relevant firm characteristic on the appointment of a VC director more directly. 
The anecdotal evidence given in the introduction about how VCs get appointed to the 
boards of mature public firms reveals that these firms gain VC directors on their board 
through the acquisition of VC-backed target firms. In order to test this hypothesis, we 
investigate the relationship between the appointment of a VC director to the boards of mature 
public firms and these firms’ acquisitions of VC-backed targets around the VC director 
appointment, in a regression framework. Column (I) of Table 2 provides the estimates of the 
regression model, where the dependent variable is the percentage of the total acquisition 
volume invested in VC-backed targets in a given year and the independent variable of 
interest is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm appoints at least one VC 
director to its board in that year and zero otherwise. We also include firm characteristics such 
as board size, number of independent directors on board, director ownership, firm size, firm 
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public age, Tobin’s Q, sales growth and leverage as control variables in the regression. The 
coefficient of the VC director appointment dummy turns out to be positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level implying that the public firms in our sample undertake a greater 
volume of acquisitions of VC-backed target firms around the time of a VC director 
appointment. This result is consistent with the view that acquisitions of VC-backed target 
firms represent an important channel through which VCs get appointed to the boards of 
acquiring public firms.  
In addition to acquiring VC-backed targets, firms can also gain VC directors on their 
board through their strategic relationships with other firms. Columns (II) and (III) of Table 2 
present the Poisson maximum likelihood estimates for the determinants of the number of 
joint ventures and strategic alliances formed by our sample of firms around VC director 
appointments. The coefficient of the VC director appointment dummy turns out to be positive 
and statistically significant in both models, implying that the appointments of VC directors 
on the boards of mature public firms coincide with these firms forming joint ventures and 
strategic alliances with other firms. This result suggests that by broadening their network 
with other companies through joint ventures and strategic alliances, these public firms might 
increase their chance to appoint experienced VC directors to their boards who might be 
affiliated with the partner companies. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
VC DIRECTORS AND PATENTING ACTIVITY 
Even though R&D expenditure is the most commonly used measure for a firm’s 
potential for innovativeness, patents produced by a firm are shown to be a better measure for 
the research productivity of the firm compared to its R&D outlays (Trajtenberg (1990) and 
Griliches (1990)). In this section, we analyze the patenting activity of our sample of firms 
and investigate whether the presence of VC directors on boards is related to the patenting 
activity of the firm. 
The patent database, created by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001), comes from 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). These data comprise detailed information 
on all U.S. patents granted between January 1963 and December 2002, all citations made to 
these patents between 1975 and 2002, and a broad match of patents to Compustat firms.1 Due 
to data limitations, we are able to analyze the innovation output of our sample of firms in 
terms of the patents they produce and the citations they receive only for the years from 1998 
to 2002. It is important to note that NBER records a patent only after it is granted, i.e. after it 
is approved by United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), which causes the patent 
data to suffer from a truncation problem. For example, we don’t have data on most of the 
patents filed in 2001 and 2002 since the review process by the patent office takes on average 
two years, as reported in Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) and, as a result, these patents are 
                                                          
1The original work by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) covers patent data until the end of year 1999, which is 
then extended by Bronwyn H. Hall until the end of year 2002. 
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not very likely to be approved by the patent office till the end of 2002. We therefore conduct 
our analysis on patents for two alternative time periods, one from 1998 to 2000 and the other 
one from 1998 to 2002. 
We analyze the number of patents produced by our sample of firms as a measure of 
their research productivity. However, the simple count of patents on its own is not a correct 
measure for the technological or economical significance of the patents. Trajtenberg (1990) 
and Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) document that patent citations are a good measure of 
the value of innovations since they show the cited patent’s influence on further research 
activities and its economical significance. Therefore, in addition to the number of patents, we 
also investigate the number of citations received by our sample of firms on the patents they 
produce and the number of citations received per patent produced. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the total number of patents 
produced by our sample of public firms that were eventually granted. For years from 1998 to 
2000, where we have relatively more complete patent data, firms with VC directors produce 
more patents per year compared to firms with no VC directors. Once we pool these three 
years’ patent data, we find that firms with VC directors produce approximately 69 patents per 
year compared to 48 patents per year for firms with no VC directors. Moreover, the median 
number of patents produced by these firms is thirteen for the former group and eight for the 
latter one, the difference being statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Panel B of Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the total number of citations 
received by our sample of firms until year 2002 on all the patents they had produced in each 
year. For example, firms with VC directors received on average 131 citations until year 2002 
on the patents they had produced in year 1998 whereas firms with no VC directors received 
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on average 65 citations. Since a patent can receive a citation only after being approved by the 
patent office, the difference between the two groups of firms is more apparent for early years 
in the patent database where there is more time for the produced patent to receive future 
citations. Once we pool the first three years’ citation data, we find that firms with VC 
directors received approximately 61 citations compared to 40 citations for firms with no VC 
directors. The median number of citations received by these firms is six for the former group 
and four for the latter one, the difference being statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Panel C of Table 3 presents summary statistics for the total number of patents, 
citations and citations per patent as a function of the number of VC directors on board. We 
find that firms with three or more VC directors on board produce a higher number of patents 
and receive a higher number of citations on average than firms with no VC directors on 
board, with the difference being statistically significant at the 1% level. Firms with three or 
more VC directors also receive a greater number of citations per patent than firms with no 
VC directors on board. Among the firms with at least one VC director on board, firms with 
three or more VC directors have the highest number of patents, the highest number of 
citations and also the highest number of citations per patent suggesting that the impact of an 
additional VC director on a firm’s research productivity is increasing in the number of VC 
directors on board. These results show that firms with VC directors on board are not only 
more innovative in terms of their patenting ability but they also have more influential and 
economically significant innovations as measured by the number of citations they receive per 
patent. 
CHAPTER 6 
VC DIRECTORS AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY 
In order to investigate whether our finding that firms with VC directors are more 
R&D intensive and innovative could be explained by these firms acquiring more R&D 
intensive and VC-backed targets, or these firms establishing joint ventures (JVs) and 
strategic alliances with other R&D intensive and VC-backed firms, in this section, we 
analyze how the presence of VC directors on board affects a firm’s acquisitions, corporate 
venture capital (CVC) investments, JVs and strategic alliances. 
Data on acquisition activity comes from Securities Data Company (SDC)’s Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&A) database. We include only completed deals and exclude buybacks, 
exchange offers and recapitalizations from the M&A data. Data on JVs and strategic 
alliances also comes from SDC’s M&A database, and the data on CVC comes from SDC 
VentureXpert database. There are a total of 9,436 M&A transactions, 3,306 CVC rounds, 
1,395 joint ventures and 6,637 strategic alliances, in which our sample of firms participated 
from 1998 to 2006. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the total acquisition volume as a percentage of the 
firm’s market value of assets is lower for firms with VC directors compared to firms with no 
VC directors. Firms with VC directors also differ from firms with no VC directors in terms 
of their acquisition patterns. More specifically, firms with VC directors undertake smaller 
and more focused acquisitions, pay more with stock than cash and are more likely to acquire 
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private firms compared to firms with no VC directors. Among firms which conduct an 
acquisition, firms with VC directors invest on average 31.06% of their total acquisition 
volume in VC-backed targets, whereas firms with no VC directors invest only half of this 
amount (16.57%) in VC-backed targets, suggesting that the higher R&D intensity and 
innovation activity of firms with VC directors compared to firms with no VC directors could 
be due to these firms acquiring more VC-backed target firms, which are innovative firms. 
We also explore in more detail how VC directors may affect the acquisition behavior 
of the firms, whose board they serve on. It could be that they facilitate the acquisition of 
other VC-backed firms through their contacts and business links with VCs in potential target 
firms. While the board of director data is available for all the acquiring firms, there is much 
less information about boards of the target firms. The reason is that only 1,272 transactions 
(i.e. 13.48% of all the M&A transactions from 1998 to 2006) involve a public target firm, for 
which IRRC data might be available.1 We are able to identify the target firms’ boards for 144 
transactions, 56 of which involve acquiring firms with VC directors on board and 88 of 
which involve acquiring firms with no VC directors on board. We find that 48.21% of the 
firms with VC directors acquired targets with at least one VC director on board whereas this 
percentage decreases to 20.45% for firms with no VC directors. We find a positive 
correlation of 0.29 between having a VC director on board in the acquiring firm and having a 
VC director on board in the target firm, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
finding suggests that the presence of a VC director on board may facilitate the acquisition of 
firms with VC involvement. This result is similar to the finding in Gompers and Xuan (2008) 
that an acquisition is more likely to take place when there is a common VC investor in the 
                                                          
1Other frequencies for the public status of the target firms are: Private (4,943), subsidiary (3,024), joint venture 
(187) and government (10). 
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acquiring and the target firm, establishing a bridge between the two firms and reducing the 
asymmetric information in the transaction.  
Gompers and Xuan (2008) define a public firm as VC-backed if that firm was VC-
backed at the time of its IPO. Our definition differs considerably from theirs in that they have 
a static definition for VC-backed public firms, whereas we define firms with VC directors 
dynamically over time. That is, since we can keep track of the public firms’ boards over time, 
we are able to identify which firms have VC directors and which firms do not, at each point 
in time. As we mentioned before, 36.9% of the mature public firms in our sample, which 
were VC-backed at the time of their IPO, do not have VC directors in any of the years in our 
sample time period, whereas 26.9% of the firms, which were not VC-backed at the time of 
their IPO, gain VC directors long time after their IPO in the sample period. Therefore, being 
VC-backed at the time of the IPO does not necessarily correspond to having a VC 
involvement in later years. Our finding shows that even if there is a positive correlation 
between a firm being VC-backed at the time of its IPO and having a VC director later in its 
public life, our definition leads to a more precise classification of mature public firms with 
respect to their relations to VCs. 
There is a growing literature on the use of CVC to promote innovation output of 
mature established firms. While firms with VC directors have a lower acquisition activity 
than firms with no VC directors, it could be that these firms prefer to grow through minority 
acquisitions by undertaking CVC investment in entrepreneurial start-ups. It is also possible 
that firms with VC directors substitute majority acquisitions with smaller minority 
acquisitions especially given the evidence that that acquiring firms do not gain from 
acquisitions when they undertake majority acquisitions. Therefore, firms with VC directors 
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can use CVC as an alternative way to invest in other companies by taking minority equity 
positions. Panel B of Table 4 shows that firms with VC directors provide CVC to a higher 
number of portfolio companies, invest a larger amount of CVC (normalized by firm size) in 
these portfolio companies, and have a larger amount of total CVC under management than 
firms with no VC directors, all differences being significant at the 1% level. This result 
shows that CVC investments might substitute for acquisitions in firms with VC directors, and 
these investments might be one of the channels through which the innovation output of these 
firms with VC directors is increasing. 
In addition to helping public firms, whose board they serve on, acquire VC-backed 
targets and provide CVC to entrepreneurial start-ups, VC directors could also be facilitating 
contacts or strategic links and alliances between these public firms and other VC-backed or 
R&D intensive firms. In fact, consistent with this view, Lindsey (2008) shows that VC-
backed private firms are more likely to form a strategic alliance if they share the same VC. 
We explore a similar possibility for our sample of mature firms by investigating whether 
having a VC director on board is positively related to the firm establishing strategic alliances 
and joint ventures with other firms. VC directors could be influential or key in making such 
transactions possible by using their network of contacts and relationships with other VCs. 
Panel C of Table 4 shows that firms with VC directors form a higher number of strategic 
alliances with other companies than firms with no VC directors.  
CHAPTER 7 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In order to test whether our univariate results hold in a multivariate setting after 
controlling for firm characteristics, which have shown to be important determinants of R&D 
and acquisition volume, we conduct fixed effects regressions of R&D outlays and the 
acquisition volume for our sample of public firms. We use Poisson maximum likelihood 
models to verify our results on the number of patents and citations obtained by our sample of 
firms and our results on the number of joint ventures and strategic alliances formed by them. 
Logit models are employed for binary dependent variables such as a dummy variable 
indicating whether a firm in our sample acquires a VC-backed target or not. 
In most of the models that we employ, we have four primary variables of interest 
which measure VC directorship on boards. More specifically, we define three dummy 
variables to describe firms with VC directors on their board. VC1 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the firm has one VC director on board and zero otherwise. VC2 takes 
the value of one if the firm has two VC directors on board and zero otherwise, and finally 
VC3 takes the value of one if the firm has three or more VC directors on board and zero 
otherwise. The fourth primary variable is the number of VC directors on board.1 
The main control variables that we include in our models are the number of 
independent directors on board, director ownership defined as the proportion of outstanding 
                                                          
1We use the number of VC directors on board rather than the proportion of VC directors on board in the 
multivariate models in order to provide easy comparison with our univariate results. However, our multivariate 
results are robust to alternative definitions of the VC director-related variables.  
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shares owned by all directors of the firm, firm size defined as the natural logarithm of the 
market value of assets, Tobin’s Q given by the ratio of the market value of assets to the book 
value of assets, leverage defined as interest bearing debt divided by operating assets, and firm 
public age given by the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s IPO. All of 
our models include firm and/or industry fixed effects and year dummies as well to control for 
unobservable attributes. Finally, to correct for heteroskedasticity and correlation of errors 
within firms, we cluster standard errors at the firm level.   
7.1. R&D expenditures and patenting activity 
Our first set of regressions involves panel data estimates relating the R&D outlays 
(normalized by firm size) to VC directors on board and other firm characteristics that might 
play a role in explaining the R&D expenditures of firms. Table 5 presents the results. Model 
(I) shows that the coefficients for VC1 and VC2 are positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level. In model (II), we use the number of VC directors on board as our main variable of 
interest and find a positive and significant coefficient on this variable as well. Therefore, both 
specifications indicate a positive and statistically significant relation between the number of 
VC directors and the firm’s R&D outlays, even after controlling for firm fixed effects. R&D 
expenditures are also positively related to the number of independent directors on board. 
These results suggest that the presence of VC human capital in mature public firms has a 
positive effect on the R&D activity of the firm. Our finding on the positive relation between 
the number of VC directors and R&D activity remains robust after controlling for industry 
fixed effects in addition to firm fixed effects. Models (III) and (IV) in Table 5 show the 
results under these alternative specifications.     
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Our univariate results have shown that firms with VC directors are more innovative 
as measured by their patenting activity than firms with no VC directors. The greater R&D 
intensity in firms with VC directors documented here might explain their higher innovation 
output. We test this relationship in a multivariate setting, where we estimate Poisson 
maximum likelihood models to investigate the determinants of the number of patents, the 
number of citations and the number of citations per patent obtained by our sample of firms. 
To eliminate the truncation problem related to patents and citations mentioned before, 
the patent related variables are adjusted for industry and year effects before running the 
regressions. More specifically, the number of patents is adjusted by dividing the number of 
patents of a firm by the mean number of patents in the same cohort to which the patent 
belongs, where the cohorts are constructed for each year and technology class defined by 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).2 Similar adjustments are made for the 
number of citations and the number of citations per patent as well. The adjusted numbers are 
then rounded to the nearest integer to be used as the dependent variables in the Poisson 
models. 
Table 6 presents the estimates for the Poisson maximum likelihood models of the 
patenting activity for our sample of firms. As expected, the coefficient of the R&D intensity 
is positive and statistically significant in determining the number of patents, citations and 
citations per patent obtained by the sample firms. The number of VC directors on itself does 
not seem to affect a firm’s patenting activity. However, its interactions with R&D intensity 
and firm public age turn out to be significant in determining the patenting activity. More 
specifically, the coefficient of the interaction term between the number of VC directors and 
                                                          
2The technology classes defined by USPTO are: Computers and communications, drugs and medical, electrical 
and electronics, chemical, mechanical and others. 
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the R&D intensity is positive and significant in determining the number of citations per 
patent, suggesting that the positive effect of R&D on the technological or economical 
significance of the patents (given by citations per patent) is stronger in firms with VC 
directors on board compared to firms with no VC directors on board. 
Results in Table 6 also show that younger firms are more active in patenting activity 
compared to older firms. However, once we interact the firm public age with the number of 
VC directors, we find that the relationship between the firm public age and the firm’s 
patenting activity reverses its sign with the sample firms obtaining more patents and citations 
as they get older if they have more VC directors on board. Overall, our results on the 
patenting output suggest that the presence of VC directors is positively related to the firm’s 
innovation activity. Hence, our  results complement the finding in Kortum and Lerner (2000) 
that increases in venture capital activity in an industry are associated with significantly 
higher patenting rates. While Kortum and Lerner (2000) look at VC funding in private firms 
in an industry, our results are complementary in that we obtain a similar finding regarding the 
positive effect of VCs on innovation output for public firms. 
7.2. Acquisition activity 
Having documented that firms with VC directors are more R&D intensive and 
innovative in terms of their patenting activity, we now turn our attention to whether these 
firms keep their R&D and innovation focus when they undertake acquisitions. It could be 
that firms with VC directors pursue acquisitions with a focus on their innovation output by 
acquiring R&D intensive firms and VC-backed firms. In this section, we address this 
question by examining whether having a VC director on board affects the types of 
acquisitions the firm undertakes.  
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We first run panel data regressions which relate the acquisition volume (normalized 
by size) by our sample of firms to the number of VC directors on board and other firm 
characteristics that might have an effect on acquisitions. Table 7 presents the results. Model 
(I) shows that the coefficients for VC2 and VC3 are negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% and 1% level, respectively. In model (II), we use the number of VC directors on 
board as our main variable of interest and find a negative and significant coefficient on this 
variable as well. Therefore, both specifications indicate a negative and statistically significant 
relation between the number of VC directors and the firm’s acquisition volume even after 
controlling for firm fixed effects. We obtain nearly the same results after controlling for 
industry fixed effects in addition to firm fixed effects. Columns (III) and (IV) in Table 7 
present the estimates for this case. These results verify our univariate finding that firms with 
VC directors undertake less acquisitions compared to firms with no VC directors. 
We further explore whether the differences shown in the univariate analysis between 
firms with VC directors and firms with no VC directors in terms of their acquisition patterns 
still hold in a multivariate framework. We run regressions with the percentage of the total 
acquisition volume invested by the firm in the given type of acquisition as the dependent 
variable. Columns from (V) to (VII) in Table 7 present the results. Column (V) shows that 
firms with VC directors invest a higher percentage of their total acquisition volume in VC-
backed targets compared to firms with no VC directors on board, and Column (VI) shows 
that firms with VC directors invest a higher percentage of their total acquisition volume in 
private targets. Hence, supporting our univariate results, we find that firms with VC directors 
are more likely to acquire private and VC-backed targets than firms without VC directors.3 
                                                          
3The data about the venture capital imbursements to target firms comes from SDC’s VentureXpert database. 
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Our finding that firms with VC directors invest a higher percentage of their total 
acquisition volume in VC-backed targets does not provide information about the likelihood 
of these firms to acquire VC-backed firms in the first place. We therefore estimate logit 
models for the probability of a mature public firm in our sample to acquire a VC-backed 
target, where the dependent variable takes the value of one if the target firm is VC-backed 
and zero otherwise. Columns (VIII) and (IX) in Table 7 present the results. The coefficients 
of the VC indicators and the coefficient of the number of VC directors turn out to be positive 
and statistically significant implying that having VC directors on boards is positively related 
to the firm’s likelihood of acquiring VC-backed target firms. 
In order to verify that the targets acquired by the firms in our sample are also more 
R&D intensive, we estimate a fixed effects regression using the target firm’s R&D 
expenditure normalized by its size as the dependent variable.4 Model (X) of Table 7 shows 
the results. In addition to the usual control variables, we also include the acquiring firm’s 
R&D expenditure normalized by its size as an explanatory variable. We find that firms with a 
higher number of VC directors and higher R&D outlays acquire target firms which are more 
R&D intensive as well. Moreover, younger firms which have gone public more recently are 
also more likely to acquire R&D intensive targets. These findings are consistent with our 
earlier results that the presence of VC human capital in mature public firms affects their 
R&D intensity positively which, in turn, positively affects the innovation activity and 
innovation output of such firms.  
Overall, our results in this section support the view that firms with VC directors 
exhibit a greater focus on R&D and innovation by acquiring more VC-backed firms and 
                                                          
4The sample size in model (X) of Table 7 drops considerably compared to models (V) through (VII) since we 
are able to find the target firm’s R&D only if it is public and available in the Compustat database. 
27 
 
firms with higher R&D intensity compared to firms with no VC directors. These results are 
consistent with the idea that having VC directors on board affects a firm’s acquisition 
strategy, i.e. the type of the acquisitions it undertakes, and such firms set their acquisition 
strategy with a focus on their R&D and innovation output.  
7.3. Joint ventures and strategic alliances 
A growing literature in financial economics studies strategic alliances and joint 
ventures, where two firms join forces for technological advancement or to improve their 
innovation prospects. Lindsey (2008) studies strategic alliances between U.S. firms and 
documents that VC-backed firms are more likely to form a strategic alliance if they share the 
same venture capital investor. Robinson and Stuart (2007) examine strategic alliances in the 
biotechnology industry and document that when two firms are closely linked in the alliance 
network, their deal is less likely to involve equity participation and more likely to involve 
funding pledges from clients. Both of these studies emphasize the positive effect of 
networking on establishing strategic relationships among firms. Following a similar logic, the 
relationships of VC directors with each other and with the public firms involved may play a 
role in initiating strategic relationships and investments with other VC-backed and 
innovation oriented firms. Hence, in this section, we investigate whether having VC directors 
on board is positively related to the firms’ strategic alliance and joint venture activities. 
Columns (I) through (IV) in Table 8 present the estimates for the Poisson maximum 
likelihood models of the number of joint ventures (JVs) and the number of strategic alliances 
formed by our sample of firms. Models (I) and (II) have the number of JVs as the dependent 
variable, and models (III) and (IV) have the number of strategic alliances as the dependent 
variable. We include the usual control variables and firm fixed effects in these models. The 
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coefficients of the VC director indicators and the coefficient of the number of VC directors 
turn out to be positive and statistically significant, both for JV and alliance models. This 
result suggests that firms with a greater number of VC directors engage in a greater number 
of JVs and strategic alliances, thereby providing support for the VC directors’ role as a 
facilitator for strategic relationships with other firms. 
The innovation focus of the public firms with VC directors can be more directly 
tested by exploring whether these firms are more likely to start partnerships with other VC-
backed firms in joint ventures (JVs) and strategic alliances compared to firms with no VC 
directors.5 In models (V) through (VII) of Table 8, we estimate logit models for the 
probability of a firm in our sample to form JVs and strategic alliances with VC-backed 
companies. In models (V) and (VI), the dependent variable takes the value of one if the 
partner firm in the JV is VC-backed and zero otherwise, and in model (VII) the dependent 
variable takes the value of one if the partner firm in the alliance is VC-backed and zero 
otherwise. The coefficients of the VC indicators and the coefficient of the number of VC 
directors turn out to be positive and significant in JV models implying that the higher the 
number of VC directors on board the higher the likelihood of the firm to form a joint venture 
with a VC-backed firm rather than a nonVC-backed firm. For alliances, however, we don’t 
find a significant effect of VC directors on alliances with VC-backed firms. 
Overall, our results on JVs and strategic alliances suggest that the VC directors play a 
significant role in expanding the investment opportunity set of the firms they oversee and 
also in facilitating strategic relationships of these firms with other entrepreneurial VC-backed 
firms. 
7.4. Determinants of VC director appointments and departures 
                                                          
5The data about the venture capital imbursements to partner firms comes from SDC’s VentureXpert database. 
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Our results so far have shown that after controlling for firm, industry and year fixed 
effects, firms with VC directors spend more on R&D, are more likely to acquire VC-backed 
and R&D intensive firms, and are more likely to form strategic relationships with other VC-
backed firms in the form of strategic alliances and joint ventures. One key concern about 
these results could be that the causality may be in the reverse direction. In other words, it 
could be that innovative and R&D intensive firms, which acquire VC-backed targets and 
which form strategic relationships with VC-backed firms, are more likely to gain VC 
directors on their boards as a result of their transactions with these VC-backed firms, rather 
than the VC directors making the public firms, whose boards they serve on, more innovative 
and R&D intensive. 
In this section, we address this potential endogeneity of VC directors with respect to 
R&D, acquisitions of VC-backed targets, and JVs and alliances established with VC-backed 
targets. We study an alternative case that might also lead to a positive relation between VC 
directors and R&D expenditures, between VC directors and VC-backed target acquisition 
activity, and between VC directors and the number of JVs and alliances with VC-backed 
firms. More specifically, we explore whether firms are more likely to appoint VC directors 
on their board when they are more R&D intensive, when they acquire a greater number of 
VC-backed targets, and when they form a greater number of JVs and strategic alliances with 
VC-backed firms. It is also possible that the VCs are attracted to these firms perhaps because 
they can learn from the innovation capability of these firms. 
We estimate logit models to investigate the determinants of VC director appointments 
and VC director departures. We control for firm characteristics as well as director related 
characteristics in our models, and use their one-year lagged values as explanatory variables. 
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The variables of interest are the firm’s R&D (normalized by its size), the acquisition volume 
it invests in VC-backed targets (normalized by its size), and its number of JVs and alliances 
with VC-backed firms. The results are reported in Table 9. Columns (I) and (II) present the 
results for the VC director appointments, where the dependent variable takes the value of one 
if at least one VC director is appointed to the board and zero otherwise, with model (I) 
including industry fixed effects and model (II) including firm fixed effects. Similarly, 
columns (III) and (IV) present the results for the VC director departures, where the 
dependent variable takes the value of one if a VC director departs from the board and zero 
otherwise, with model (III) including industry fixed effects and model (IV) including firm 
fixed effects. 
Model (I) in Table 9 shows that a firm’s R&D is positively related to the probability 
of appointing a VC director, whereas the acquisition volume it invests in VC-backed targets 
and the number of its JVs and alliances with VC-backed firms are unrelated to VC director 
appointment. Once we account for firm fixed effects in model (II), the significance of R&D 
disappears as well leaving only the director’s age and the number of directorships he or she 
holds as the only factors affecting the appointment of a VC director. These results on the VC 
director appointment do not support the alternative view that innovative and R&D intensive 
firms are more likely to gain VC directors on their boards. The results in this section rather 
support our findings so far that the VC directors make the public firms, whose boards they 
serve on, more innovative and R&D intensive.  
Model (III) in Table 9 shows that a firm’s R&D is also positively related to the 
probability of a VC director to depart. The acquisition volume a firm invests in VC-backed 
targets turns out to positively affect the VC director departure as well, whereas the number of 
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JVs and the number of alliances with VC-backed firms are unrelated to VC director 
departure. Model (IV) of VC director departure with firm fixed effects causes R&D and the 
acquisition volume invested in VC-backed targets to lose their significance, while the 
number of the alliances with VC-backed firms comes out to positively affect a VC director’s 
departure. These findings about the VC director departure work against the alternative view’s 
conjecture that innovative and R&D intensive firms are more likely to gain VC directors on 
their boards, since more R&D, a greater investment in VC-backed targets and a greater 
number of alliances with VC-backed firms lead to a VC director departure rather than a VC 
director appointment.   
Overall, we find that a firm’s R&D, its acquisition volume invested in VC-backed 
targets, and the number of its JVs and alliances with VC-backed firms do not play a role in 
determining a VC director appointment. This finding suggests that our documented results so 
far on the positive relation between VC directors and the firm’s R&D, its acquisition volume 
of VC-backed targets and the number of its JVs and alliances with VC-backed firms is robust 
to the potential endogeneity of VC directors. 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation provides the first piece of evidence that VCs play an important role 
in mature public firms long time after their IPO. This result is novel since the existing 
literature on venture capital so far has mainly concentrated on different roles VCs play for 
small and private companies. Our study complements the existing work by documenting that 
VCs add value to mature public companies past their IPO stage. More specifically, our study 
shows that VCs serve on the boards of mature public firms, and firms with VC directors 
exhibit a greater amount of R&D and innovation output in terms of their patenting activity. 
Firms with VC directors are more likely to acquire private, R&D intensive and VC-backed 
firms, and more likely to establish business relationships with other VC-backed firms in the 
form of strategic alliances and joint ventures. In addition, such firms exhibit a greater amount 
of corporate venture capital investment in VC-backed entrepreneurial start-ups.  
Overall, this dissertation suggests that, in addition to their role as providers of finance 
and advice for small and private firms, VCs play a significant role for mature public firms, 
even long time after the IPO stage, especially in promoting R&D and innovation activity in 
such firms.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of board, director and firm characteristics for IRRC firms between 1998 and 2006. Panel A presents the 
descriptive board statistics of our sample. VC directors are directors serving on public firms’ boards who are actually executives or partners of venture capital 
firms. Inside directors are employees of the firms whose board they serve on. Linked directors are directors having some sort of family or business ties to the 
firms whose board they serve on. Busy directors are directors who serve on three or more boards. Panel B and Panel C present the descriptive statistics of 
director characteristics for IRRC firms. Panel B reports the statistics for dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a director belongs to the specified category 
and 0 otherwise. Panel C reports the statistics for dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a director serves on the specified committee or is the chair of the 
specified committee and 0 otherwise. Panel D presents the descriptive firm statistics of our sample of IRRC firms. Firm age is defined as the number of years 
since the firm’s foundation. “VC-backed at the time of IPO” is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is VC-backed at the time of the IPO 
and 0 otherwise. The market value of assets (MVA) is defined as total assets minus total equity plus market capitalization given by the number of shares 
outstanding times the share price. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Board Statistics 
 
Overall sample 
 
Firms with at least one VC 
director on board 
 
Firms with no VC director 
on board 
 
Comparison between VC- 
and nonVC-board firms 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
Board size 10118 9.00 9 
 
3084 9.03 9 
 
7034 8.99 9 
 
0.85 0.01 
Number of VC directors 10118 0.41 0 
 
3084 1.35 1 
 
7034 0.00 0 
   Percentage of VC directors 10118 4.91 0 
 
3084 16.09 12.5 
 
7034 0.00 0 
   Percentage of independent 
directors 10118 66.01 66.67 
 
3084 68.19 71.43 
 
7034 65.05 66.67 
 
8.75*** 8.34*** 
Percentage of inside directors 10118 20.68 16.67 
 
3084 19.21 16.67 
 
7034 21.32 18.18 
 
-9.31*** -7.34*** 
Percentage of linked directors 10118 13.29 11.11 
 
3084 12.59 11.11 
 
7034 13.60 11.11 
 
-3.43*** -3.85*** 
Percentage of busy directors 10118 23.00 20.00 
 
3084 26.47 25.00 
 
7034 21.48 16.67 
 
11.44*** 12.41*** 
Percentage of shares held by all 
directors and officers 10118 11.39 5.70 
 
3084 9.64 4.90 
 
7034 12.16 6.10 
 
-8.42*** -7.27*** 
Percentage of shares held by all 
directors 10104 9.89 3.97 
 
3078 8.16 3.35 
 
7026 10.65 4.32 
 
-6.77*** -6.96*** 
Average percentage of shares 
held by each director 10104 1.20 0.48 
 
3078 0.97 0.41 
 
7026 1.30 0.51 
 
-8.30*** -6.62*** 
Percentage of votes held by all 
directors 10115 10.39 2.90 
 
3083 8.37 2.30 
 
7032 11.27 3.30 
 
-7.15*** -7.51*** 
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Panel B: Descriptive Director Statistics 
 
Overall sample 
 
VC directors 
 
Non-VC directors 
 
Comparison between VC 
and non-VC directors 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
VC director (indicator) 91092 0.05 0.00 
 
4166 1 1 
 
86926 0 0 
   Independent director (indicator) 91092 0.66 1 
 
4166 0.82 1 
 
86926 0.66 1 
 
26.61*** 21.89*** 
Inside director (indicator) 91092 0.20 0 
 
4166 0.04 0 
 
86926 0.21 0 
 
-50.28*** -26.44*** 
Linked director (indicator) 91092 0.14 0 
 
4166 0.14 0 
 
86926 0.14 0 
 
0.74 0.74 
Number of other boards served 91046 0.91 0 
 
4163 1.28 1 
 
86883 0.90 0 
 
17.29*** 20.95*** 
Percentage of shares held 90994 1.10 0.06 
 
4155 0.61 0.07 
 
86839 1.12 0.05 
 
-10.07*** 1.76* 
Director age 91071 59.14 59   4166 57.02 57   86905 59.24 59   -16.05*** -15.28*** 
Panel C: Committee Membership Statistics of Directors 
 
Overall sample 
 
VC directors 
 
Non-VC directors 
 
Comparison between VC 
and non-VC directors 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
Audit committee member 91092 0.40 0 
 
4166 0.50 0 
 
86926 0.39 0 
 
13.14*** 13.40*** 
Compensation committee 
member 91092 0.38 0 
 
4166 0.52 1 
 
86926 0.38 0 
 
17.83*** 18.30*** 
Nominating committee member 91092 0.33 0 
 
4166 0.37 0 
 
86926 0.33 0 
 
6.14*** 6.32*** 
Corporate governance 
committee member 91092 0.25 0 
 
4166 0.28 0 
 
86926 0.25 0 
 
5.31*** 5.53*** 
Audit committee chair 91092 0.08 0 
 
4166 0.10 0 
 
86926 0.08 0 
 
4.43*** 4.89*** 
Compensation committee chair 91092 0.08 0   4166 0.11 0   86926 0.08 0   7.72*** 9.13*** 
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Panel D: Descriptive Firm Statistics 
 
Overall Sample 
 
Firms with at least one VC 
director on board 
 
Firms with no VC director on 
board 
 
Comparison between VC- 
and nonVC-board firms 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
Firm age 3971 31.33 23 
 
1566 25.38 19 
 
2405 35.21 26 
 
-13.62*** -16.28*** 
Number of years since the 
firm went public 9250 22.81 17 
 
2841 19.40 13 
 
6409 24.32 19 
 
-12.29*** -15.30*** 
Market value of assets 
(MVA) ($ millions) 8519 11417.1 2202.5 
 
2593 13439.6 2816.6 
 
5926 10532.1 1984.0 
 
3.10*** 9.21*** 
VC-backed at the time of 
the IPO (indicator) 4608 0.45 0 
 
1768 0.65 1 
 
2840 0.32 0 
 
23.26*** 22.01*** 
Tobin's Q 8519 2.14 1.66 
 
2593 2.47 1.88 
 
5926 2.00 1.58 
 
11.13*** 13.67*** 
R&D expense  
($ millions) 8526 143.17 5.50 
 
2596 191.13 23.81 
 
5930 122.18 0.47 
 
4.65*** 16.57*** 
R&D expense (as a 
percentage of MVA) 8512 1.68 0.32 
 
2593 2.41 1.15 
 
5919 1.36 0.03 
 
13.09*** 16.00*** 
CAPEX ($ millions) 8455 299.68 54.66 
 
2573 295.26 55.70 
 
5882 301.62 54.09 
 
-0.23 0.88 
CAPEX (as a percentage 
of MVA) 8444 3.36 2.27   2570 2.80 1.82   5874 3.60 2.48   -10.21*** -12.80*** 
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Table 2. Acquisitions and partnerships around VC director appointments 
 
This table shows the regression results of the percentage of the total acquisition volume invested in VC-
backed targets in column (I), Poisson maximum likelihood estimates for the determinants of the number of 
joint ventures (JVs) and strategic alliances formed by our sample of firms in column (II) and Poisson 
maximum likelihood estimates for the determinants of the number of strategic alliances in column (III). VC 
director appointment is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm appoints at least one VC 
director to its board and 0 if any director other than a VC is appointed to the board. Board size gives the 
number of directors serving on the board, Director ownership is the proportion of shares owned by all 
directors of the firm, Firm size is the natural logarithm of market value of assets, Tobin’s Q is the lagged ratio 
of market value of assets to book value of assets, Leverage is defined as interest bearing debt divided by 
operating assets, Sales growth is the difference between the current sales and the lagged sales normalized by 
lagged sales, and Firm public age is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s IPO. The 
regressions also include a constant term and year dummies which are not reported. Industry dummies are 
assigned according to the Fama-French 48 industry groups. For each independent variable, the first row 
reports its estimated coefficient and the second row the corresponding t-statistic or z-statistic. All standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
VC-backed 
target 
 
Number of JVs and 
Strategic Alliances 
 
Number of 
Strategic Alliances 
  (I)    (II)   (III) 
VC director appointment (indicator) 15.848 
 
0.225 
 
0.306 
 
2.63*** 
 
1.75* 
 
2.35** 
Number of independent directors 1.137 
 
0.071 
 
0.084 
 
1.56 
 
3.30*** 
 
3.46*** 
Board size -22.675 
 
-0.957 
 
-1.140 
 
-2.99*** 
 
-3.69*** 
 
-4.07*** 
Director ownership -5.282 
 
-0.295 
 
-0.348 
 
-0.94 
 
-1.18 
 
-1.2 
Firm size 2.970 
 
0.732 
 
0.730 
 
3.15*** 
 
23.05*** 
 
21.42*** 
Tobin's Q 2.189 
 
-0.067 
 
-0.059 
 
2.33** 
 
-4.46*** 
 
-4.00*** 
Leverage -7.829 
 
-0.240 
 
-0.205 
 
-1.38 
 
-3.84*** 
 
-2.79*** 
Sales growth -4.881 
 
-0.582 
 
-0.683 
 
-1.21 
 
-3.7*** 
 
-3.75*** 
Firm public age -1.590 
 
-0.065 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.94 
 
-1.46 
 
-1.7* 
      Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.1325 
 
0.5075 
 
0.5100 
Sample Size 1211   3661   3661 
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Table 3. Patents and citations 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the innovative activity of the firms in our sample. Panel A reports the statistics for the patents produced and 
eventually granted, and Panel B reports the citations received by those patents. Panel C reports the pooled results for the patents, citations and citations per 
patent as a function of the number of VC directors on board. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Number of patents produced by a firm that are eventually granted 
 
Overall sample 
 
Firms with at least one VC 
director on board 
 
Firms with no VC director on 
board 
 
Comparison between VC- 
and nonVC-board firms 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
1998 348 59.53 9 
 
100 89.86 12 
 
248 47.29 9 
   1999 319 53.70 9 
 
101 67.38 12 
 
218 47.37 8 
   2000 271 48.71 8 
 
91 48.92 13 
 
180 48.60 6 
   2001 214 20.86 5 
 
77 19.68 6 
 
137 21.52 4 
   2002 61 3.39 2 
 
20 2.70 2 
 
41 3.73 2 
   1998-2000 938 54.42 9 
 
292 69.33 13 
 
646 47.68 8 
 
1.27 3.25*** 
1998-2002 1213 45.93 7   389 56.07 10   824 41.15 6   1.15 3.14*** 
Panel B: Number of citations received by a firm until  2002 on all the patents it has produced 
 
Overall sample 
 
Firms with at least one VC 
director on board 
 
Firms with no VC director on 
board 
 
Comparison between VC- 
and nonVC-board firms 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
1998 348 84.04 9 
 
100 130.95 12 
 
248 65.12 8 
   1999 319 35.69 5 
 
101 38.43 6 
 
218 34.42 4 
   2000 271 10.98 1 
 
91 9.57 2 
 
180 11.69 1 
   2001 214 0.88 0 
 
77 0.56 0 
 
137 1.06 0 
   2002 61 0.02 0 
 
20 0.00 0 
 
41 0.02 0 
   1998-2000 938 46.49 4 
 
292 61.12 6 
 
646 39.87 4 
 
1.02 1.72* 
1998-2002 1213 36.10 2   389 45.99 2   824 31.44 2   0.92 0.66 
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Panel C: Number of patents, citations and citations per patent as a function of the number of VCs on board 
 
Firms with no VC on 
board 
 
Firms with 1 VC on 
board 
 
Firms with 2 VCs on 
board 
 
Firms with 3 or more 
VCs on board 
 
Comparison between 
firms with 3 or more 
VCs on board and 
firms with no VC on 
board 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   
t-
statistics 
z-
statistics 
Patents 1998-2000 646 47.68 8 
 
208 71.86 11 
 
58 58.43 12 
 
26 73.35 27 
 
0.90 3.14*** 
Patents 1998-2002 824 41.15 6 
 
282 57.55 9.5 
 
75 47.23 7 
 
32 63.81 26 
 
0.97 3.29*** 
 Citations 1998-2000 646 39.87 4 
 
208 62.46 5 
 
58 49.36 6 
 
26 76.65 14 
 
1.11 2.99*** 
Citations 1998-2002 824 31.44 2 
 
282 46.20 1 
 
75 38.21 2 
 
32 62.41 9 
 
1.17 2.90*** 
Citations per patent 
1998-2000 646 0.69 0.47 
 
208 0.55 0.37 
 
58 0.57 0.33 
 
26 0.86 0.67 
 
0.96 1.66* 
Citations per patent 
1998-2002 824 0.55 0.22   282 0.41 0.16   75 0.45 0.17   32 0.70 0.43   1.05 1.85* 
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Table 4. Acquisitions, corporate venture capital and strategic partnerships 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the M&A transactions, CVC investments, joint ventures and strategic alliances conducted by our sample of 
firms between 1998 and 2006. Panel A reports the volume of different types of acquisitions as a percentage of total acquisition volume. Relative deal size is 
calculated for each acquisition and is defined as the transaction value as a percentage of the acquiring firm’s size. Panel B shows the number and volume of 
the corporate venture capital (CVC) investments of the sample firms. Panel C presents the number of joint ventures and strategic alliances formed by the 
sample firms. The market value of assets (MVA) is defined as total assets minus total equity plus market capitalization given by the number of shares 
outstanding times the share price. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Acquisition Activity 
 
Overall Sample 
 
Firms with at least one VC 
director on board 
 
Firms with no VC director 
on board 
 
Comparison between VC- 
and nonVC-board firms 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
Acquisition volume as a 
percentage of acquirer’s 
MVA 3005 7.35 2.73 
 
1112 6.91 2.50 
 
1893 7.62 2.88 
 
-1.47 -1.89* 
Relative deal size as a 
percentage of acquirer's 
MVA 4387 5.02 1.41 
 
1762 4.39 1.12 
 
2625 5.44 1.60 
 
-3.34*** -5.77*** 
Cash financed acquisition 
volume as % of total 
acquisition volume 3005 78.93 100 
 
1112 74.72 100 
 
1893 81.41 100 
 
-4.39*** -4.47*** 
Private target acquisition 
volume as % of total 
acquisition volume 3005 36.52 0 
 
1112 39.77 1.56 
 
1893 34.61 0 
 
2.97*** 3.61*** 
Diversifying acquisition 
volume as % of total 
acquisition volume 3005 39.76 0   1112 37.55 0   1893 41.06 0   -1.98** -1.84* 
VC-backed target acquisition 
volume as % of total 
acquisition volume 3005 21.93 0 
 
1112 31.06 0 
 
1893 16.57 0 
 
9.43*** 10.50*** 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    40 
Panel B: Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) Investments 
 Overall Sample 
 
Firms with at least one VC 
director on board 
 
Firms with no VC director 
on board 
 
Comparison between VC- 
and nonVC-board firms 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
Number of portfolio 
companies for which the 
firm provided CVC 10118 0.33 0 
 
3084 0.45 0 
 
7034 0.27 0 
 
2.42** 11.72*** 
Total CVC invested by the 
firm's fund in the portfolio 
companies (as a 
percentage of its MVA) 8507 0.01 0 
 
2592 0.01 0 
 
5915 0.00 0 
 
5.86*** 10.96*** 
Total CVC under the 
firm's management (as a 
percentage of its MVA) 8207 0.02 0   2415 0.03 0   5792 0.01 0   3.14*** 3.75*** 
Panel C: Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances 
 
Overall Sample 
 
Firms with at least one VC 
director on board 
 
Firms with no VC director 
on board 
 
Comparison between VC- and 
nonVC-board firms 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
Total number of joint 
ventures 10118 0.14 0 
 
3084 0.15 0 
 
7034 0.13 0 
 
1.19 0.1502 
Total number of strategic 
alliances 10118 0.66 0   3084 1.18 0   7034 0.43 0   9.06*** 16.97*** 
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Table 5. Regressions of R&D outlays 
 
This table shows the results of the fixed effects regressions of the R&D outlays of our sample of firms. The 
dependent variable is the R&D outlay of the firms as a percentage of their market value of assets. VC1 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has one VC director on board and 0 otherwise, VC2 takes 
the value of 1 if the firm has two directors on board and 0 otherwise, and VC3 takes the value of 1 if the firm 
has three or more directors on board and 0 otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of market value of 
assets, Tobin’s Q is the lagged ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, Leverage is defined as 
interest bearing debt divided by operating assets, and Firm public age is the natural logarithm of the number 
of years since the firm’s IPO. The regressions also include a constant term and year dummies which are not 
reported. Industry dummies are assigned according to the Fama-French 48 industry groups. For each 
independent variable, the first row reports its estimated coefficient and the second row the corresponding t-
statistic. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
R&D as a percentage of firm size 
  (I)   (II)   (III)   (IV) 
VC1 (indicator) 0.231 
   
0.229 
  
 
2.11** 
   
2.07** 
  VC2 (indicator) 0.524 
   
0.523 
  
 
2.19** 
   
2.18** 
  VC3 (indicator) 0.288 
   
0.284 
  
 
1.040 
   
1.030 
  Number of VC directors 
  
0.157 
   
0.154 
   
1.98** 
   
1.94** 
Number of independent directors 0.045 
 
0.046 
 
0.046 
 
0.047 
 
2.96*** 
 
3.03*** 
 
2.99*** 
 
3.06*** 
Firm size -1.759 
 
-1.760 
 
-1.776 
 
-1.778 
 
-12.7*** 
 
-12.7*** 
 
-12.73*** 
 
-12.73*** 
Tobin's Q -0.014 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.960 
 
-0.940 
 
-0.920 
 
-0.900 
Leverage 0.211 
 
0.210 
 
0.222 
 
0.221 
 
2.21** 
 
2.19** 
 
2.27** 
 
2.25** 
Firm public age 0.119 
 
0.127 
 
0.124 
 
0.133 
 
0.710 
 
0.750 
 
0.760 
 
0.820 
        Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry fixed effects No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1970 
 
0.1963 
 
0.1967 
 
0.1959 
Sample size 8386   8386   8386   8386 
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Table 6. Determinants of the number of patents and citations 
 
Columns (I), (II) and (III) of this table present Poisson maximum likelihood estimates for the determinants of 
the adjusted number of patents, the adjusted number of citations and the adjusted number of citations per patent 
obtained by our sample of firms, respectively. The adjusted number of patents is obtained by dividing the 
number of patents for each firm by the mean of the number of patents in the same cohort to which the patent 
belongs, where the cohorts are constructed for each year and technology class defined by United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO). Similar adjustments are made for the number of citations and the number of 
citations per patent. The adjusted numbers are then rounded to the nearest integer for the Poisson model. Firm 
public age is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s IPO, Firm size is the natural 
logarithm of market value of assets, and Tobin’s Q is the lagged ratio of market value of assets to book value of 
assets. The models also include a constant term which is not reported. For each independent variable, the first 
row reports its estimated coefficient and the second row the corresponding z-statistic. All standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Adjusted 
Patents 
 
Adjusted 
Citations 
 
Adjusted 
Citations per 
Patent 
  (I)   (II)   (III) 
Number of VC directors -1.204 
 
-1.505 
 
-0.503 
 
-1.49 
 
-1.56 
 
-1.31 
Number of independent directors 0.038 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
0.76 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.39 
R&D normalized by firm size 18.702 
 
19.742 
 
4.921 
 
4.95*** 
 
4.24*** 
 
2.60*** 
No of VC dirs * normalized R&D -0.024 
 
0.802 
 
3.749 
 
-0.01 
 
0.18 
 
1.72* 
Firm public age -0.358 
 
-0.418 
 
-0.316 
 
-1.49 
 
-1.4 
 
-1.78* 
No of VC dirs * firm public age 0.362 
 
0.407 
 
0.089 
 
1.67* 
 
1.65* 
 
0.87 
Acquisition volume normalized by firm size 0.652 
 
-0.592 
 
-0.531 
 
1.29 
 
-0.67 
 
-1.03 
No of VC dirs * normalized acquisition volume -1.070 
 
-0.195 
 
0.304 
 
-1.15 
 
-0.19 
 
0.50 
CVC volume normalized by firm size -0.085 
 
-0.586 
 
2.077 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.52 
 
3.81*** 
No of VC dirs * normalized CVC volume -0.645 
 
-0.584 
 
-1.471 
 
-1.07 
 
-0.83 
 
-4.18*** 
Firm size 0.645 
 
0.678 
 
0.226 
 
6.33*** 
 
6.68*** 
 
5.74*** 
Tobin's Q -0.037 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.82 
 
-0.47 
 
-1.1 
      Pseudo R2 0.3699 
 
0.3240 
 
0.0678 
Sample Size 1040   1040   1040 
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Table 7. Effect of VC directors on a public firm’s acquisition strategy 
 
This table presents estimates of the models for the acquisition activity of our sample of public firms. Models (I) through (VII) show the results of the fixed 
effects regressions of the acquisition volumes. Columns (I) to (IV) have the acquisition volume of the firms as a percentage of their market value of assets as 
the dependent variable. Columns (V) to (VII) have the percentage of the total acquisition volume invested in the given types of acquisitions as the dependent 
variable. Columns (VIII) and (IX) present logit estimates for the probability of a firm in our sample to acquire a VC-backed target in an M&A, where the 
dependent variable takes the value of one if the target firm acquired is VC-backed and zero otherwise. Column (X) shows OLS estimates for the target firm’s 
R&D outlays in an M&A, where the dependent variable is the target firm’s R&D in an acquisition. VC1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm has one VC director on board and 0 otherwise, VC2 takes the value of 1 if the firm has two directors on board and 0 otherwise, and VC3 takes the value 
of 1 if the firm has three or more directors on board and 0 otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of market value of assets, Tobin’s Q is the lagged ratio 
of market value of assets to book value of assets, Leverage is defined as interest bearing debt divided by operating assets, Firm public age is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s IPO, and Director ownership is the proportion of shares owned by all directors of the firm. Normalized 
R&D is the acquiring firm’s R&D normalized by its size. Private target is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm acquires a private target and 
0 otherwise. Diversifying acquistion is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer and the target are not in the same Fama-French 48 industry 
group and 0 otherwise. All models also include a constant term and year dummies which are not reported. Industry dummies are assigned according to the 
Fama-French 48 industry groups. For each independent variable, the first row reports its estimated coefficient and the second row the corresponding t- or z-
statistic. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
  Acquisition volume as a percentage of firm size   
VC-
backed 
target    
Private 
target   
Diver. 
acq’n   
Logit models for 
acquiring VC-backed 
targets 
 
Target's 
R&D 
  (I)   (II)   (III)   (IV)   (V)   (VI)   (VII)   (VIII)   (IX)   (X) 
VC1 (indicator) 0.128 
   
0.106 
         
0.256 
    
 
0.19 
   
0.16 
         
2.68*** 
    VC2 (indicator) -2.215 
   
-2.373 
         
0.403 
    
 
-2.26** 
   
-2.38** 
         
3.17*** 
    VC3 (indicator) -3.566 
   
-3.727 
         
0.225 
    
 
-2.62*** 
   
-2.73*** 
         
1.23 
    Number of VC 
directors 
  
-0.81 
   
-0.857 
 
3.999 
 
2.173 
 
0.496 
   
0.138 
 
2.058 
   
-1.95** 
   
-2.05** 
 
3.70*** 
 
1.83* 
 
0.43 
   
2.80*** 
 
2.19** 
Number of 
indep. directors -0.211 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.198 
 
-0.187 
 
-0.316 
 
-0.878 
 
1.238 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.008 
 
0.207 
 -2.49*** 
 
-2.35** 
 
-2.34** 
 
-2.20** 
 
-0.82 
 
-1.90* 
 
2.59*** 
 
-0.44 
 
-0.40 
 
0.54 
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Firm size -0.044 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.038 
 
2.22 
 
-6.46 
 
-0.376 
 
0.248 
 
0.249 
 
0.073 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.08 
 
4.02*** 
 
-9.58*** 
 
-0.56 
 
7.94*** 
 
8.26*** 
 
0.14 
Tobin's Q 0.411 
 
0.414 
 
0.411 
 
0.413 
 
0.989 
 
1.684 
 
-0.248 
 
0.010 
 
0.012 
 
-0.196 
 
1.81* 
 
1.82* 
 
1.80* 
 
1.82* 
 
2.99*** 
 
2.81*** 
 
-0.75 
 
1.34 
 
1.50 
 
-1.50 
Leverage 0.46 
 
0.466 
 
0.392 
 
0.401 
 
-2.45 
 
-4.845 
 
0.021 
 
0.023 
 
0.023 
 
0.145 
 
0.69 
 
0.7 
 
0.58 
 
0.58 
 
-0.63 
 
-1.09 
 
0.01 
 
1.09 
 
1.12 
 
0.04 
Firm public age 0.902 
 
0.931 
 
0.94 
 
0.961 
 
-1.553 
 
0.742 
 
0.316 
 
-0.085 
 
-0.089 
 
-4.407 
 
1.52 
 
1.56 
 
1.56 
 
1.58 
 
-1.58 
 
0.62 
 
0.25 
 
-1.39 
 
-1.44 
 
-3.18*** 
Director 
ownership 
        
-9.791 
 
-2.842 
 
-0.368 
      
         
-2.14** 
 
-0.51 
 
-0.06 
      Normalized 
R&D 
              
11.217 
 
11.385 
 
1.003 
               
7.02*** 
 
7.19*** 
 
2.85*** 
Private target 
(indicator) 
              
0.375 
 
0.368 
 
-1.388 
               
5.66*** 
 
5.57*** 
 
-0.43 
Diversifying 
acquisition 
(indicator) 
 
              
0.110 
 
0.111 
 
0.373 
               
1.59 
 
1.61 
 
0.24 
                    Firm fixed 
effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Industry fixed 
effects No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adjusted R2 / 
Pseudo R2 0.0101 
 
0.0093 
 
0.0097 
 
0.0089 
 
0.1311 
 
0.1059 
 
0.1218 
 
0.1281 
 
0.1272 
 
0.1314 
Sample size 8393   8393   8393   8393   2685   2685   2685   8297   8297   224 
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Table 8. Effect of VC directors on a public firm’s strategic partnerships 
 
This table presents estimates of the models for the strategic relationships formed by our sample of public firms. Models (I) through (IV) show Poisson 
maximum likelihood estimates for the determinants of the number of joint ventures (JVs) and strategic alliances. Columns (I) and (II) have the number of JVs 
as the dependent variable, and columns (III) and (IV) have the number of strategic alliances as the dependent variable. Models (V) through (VII) show logit 
estimates for the probability to collaborate with VC-backed partners in joint ventures (JVs) or strategic alliances. In columns (V) and (VI), the dependent 
variable takes the value of one if the partner firm in the JV is VC-backed and zero otherwise, and in column (VII) the dependent variable takes the value of 
one if the partner firm in the alliance is VC-backed and zero otherwise. VC1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has one VC director on 
board and 0 otherwise, VC2 takes the value of 1 if the firm has two directors on board and 0 otherwise, and VC3 takes the value of 1 if the firm has three or 
more directors on board and 0 otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of market value of assets, Tobin’s Q is the lagged ratio of market value of assets to 
book value of assets, Leverage is defined as interest bearing debt divided by operating assets, Firm public age is the natural logarithm of the number of years 
since the firm’s IPO, Director ownership is the proportion of shares owned by all directors of the firm, and Operating cash flow is sales minus the cost of 
goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses. Diversifying JV/alliance is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1if the participating firms 
are not in the same Fama-French 48 industry group. The models also include a constant term and year dummies which are not reported. Industry dummies are 
assigned according to the Fama-French 48 industry groups. For each independent variable, the first row reports its estimated coefficient and the second row 
the corresponding z-statistic. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Poisson Models 
 
Logit Models 
 
Number of  
Joint Ventures 
 
Number of  
Strategic Alliances 
 
VC-Backed  
JV Partners 
 
VC-backed 
Alliance 
Partners 
  (I)   (II)   (III)   (IV)   (V)   (VI)   (VII) 
VC1 (indicator) 0.070 
   
0.120 
   
0.034 
    
 
0.39 
   
1.93** 
   
0.08 
    VC2 (indicator) 0.797 
   
0.363 
   
1.418 
    
 
2.13** 
   
3.15*** 
   
1.90* 
    VC3 (indicator) 1.513 
   
0.334 
   
0.937 
    
 
3.06*** 
   
2.17** 
   
1.71* 
    Number of VC directors 
  
0.326 
   
0.115 
   
0.377 
 
-0.004 
   
2.37** 
   
2.52*** 
   
2.41** 
 
-0.1 
Number of independent directors 0.035 
 
0.029 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.029 
 
1.16 
 
0.95 
 
-0.73 
 
-0.59 
 
-0.44 
 
-0.33 
 
-1.48 
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R&D normalized by firm size 12.720 
 
12.585 
 
3.877 
 
3.984 
 
4.725 
 
5.237 
 
2.836 
 
3.02*** 
 
2.99*** 
 
2.74*** 
 
2.82*** 
 
0.82 
 
0.92 
 
2.05** 
No of VC dirs  
* normalized R&D -11.291 
 
-10.590 
 
0.090 
 
0.300 
      
 
-3.85*** 
 
-3.65*** 
 
0.11 
 
0.37 
      Firm size 0.264 
 
0.300 
 
0.224 
 
0.226 
 
0.174 
 
0.165 
 
0.094 
 
2.08** 
 
2.42** 
 
4.84*** 
 
4.89*** 
 
1.44 
 
1.45 
 
3.92*** 
Tobin's Q 0.059 
 
0.058 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
-0.113 
 
-0.087 
 
-0.021 
 
2.26** 
 
2.21** 
 
0.65 
 
0.76 
 
-1.65* 
 
-1.49 
 
-2.8*** 
Leverage -0.211 
 
-0.223 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.011 
 
0.352 
 
0.587 
 
-0.070 
 
-1.6 
 
-1.69* 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.16 
 
0.62 
 
0.91 
 
-0.46 
Firm public age 0.306 
 
0.261 
 
0.156 
 
0.137 
 
0.030 
 
0.005 
 
0.025 
 
1.26 
 
1.09 
 
1.43 
 
1.27 
 
0.15 
 
0.03 
 
0.51 
Director ownership -1.503 
 
-1.539 
 
0.210 
 
0.198 
      
 
-1.45 
 
-1.49 
 
0.74 
 
0.70 
      Operating cash flow -2.689 
 
-2.364 
 
1.143 
 
0.940 
      
 
-1.89* 
 
-1.68* 
 
2.00** 
 
1.66* 
      Diversifying JV/alliance 
(indicator) 
        
0.224 
 
0.289 
 
-0.305 
         
0.68 
 
0.91 
 
-4.16*** 
              Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Industry Fixed Effects No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.6849 
 
0.6841 
 
0.5870 
 
0.5868 
 
0.1538 
 
0.1480 
 
0.0639 
Sample Size 2432   2432   4587   4587   386   386   3658 
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Table 9. Determinants of the VC director appointments and departures 
 
This table presents the results of the logit models of the probability of a VC director to be appointed to the 
board and the probability of a VC director to depart from the board of our sample of firms. In columns (I) and 
(II), the dependent variable takes the value of one if at least one VC director is appointed to the board and 
zero if any director other than a VC is appointed to the board. In columns (III) and (IV), the dependent 
variable takes the value of one if a VC director departs from the board and zero if any director other than a 
VC departs from the board. Director age is the age of the appointed/departing director’s age, Number of other 
directorships is the number of other directorships held by the appointed/departing director, Female is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the appointed/departing director is a female and 0 otherwise, 
Director ownership is the proportion of shares owned by all directors of the firm, Firm public age is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s IPO, Firm size is the natural logarithm of market 
value of assets, Number of joint ventures with VC-backed firms (Number of strategic alliances with VC-
backed firms) is the number of joint ventures (strategic alliances) formed by the firm with VC-backed firms, 
Sales growth is the difference between the current sales and the lagged sales normalized by lagged sales, and 
Stock return is the buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. The models also include year and industry 
dummies which are not reported. Industries are classified according to the Fama-French 48 industry groups. 
For each independent variable, the first row reports its estimated coefficient and the second row the 
corresponding z-statistic. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and are clustered at the firm level. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
VC Director Appointment 
 
VC Director Departure 
  (I)   (II)   (III)   (IV) 
Director age -0.030 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.062 
 
-2.54*** 
 
-1.84* 
 
-4.18*** 
 
-3.69*** 
Number of other boards served 0.209 
 
0.219 
 
0.342 
 
0.495 
 
3.59*** 
 
2.42** 
 
7.04*** 
 
5.24*** 
Female (indicator) -0.261 
 
-0.380 
 
-1.455 
 
-1.546 
 
-0.99 
 
-1.12 
 
-3.42*** 
 
-3.00*** 
Number of independent directors 0.058 
 
-0.036 
 
0.045 
 
-0.238 
 
0.97 
 
-0.26 
 
0.76 
 
-1.52 
Board size -0.865 
 
-0.258 
 
-0.332 
 
3.087 
 
-1.80* 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.65 
 
2.11** 
Director ownership 1.027 
 
-0.566 
 
0.088 
 
-6.568 
 
2.67*** 
 
-0.33 
 
0.14 
 
-2.02** 
Firm public age -0.056 
 
0.505 
 
-0.310 
 
-0.757 
 
-0.45 
 
0.37 
 
-2.90*** 
 
-0.50 
Firm size 0.141 
 
-0.174 
 
0.102 
 
-0.420 
 
2.03** 
 
-0.41 
 
1.48 
 
-0.84 
R&D (normalized by firm size) 6.951 
 
-1.418 
 
10.775 
 
1.301 
 
2.72*** 
 
-0.11 
 
4.99*** 
 
0.15 
CAPEX (normalized by firm size) -0.156 
 
4.372 
 
-11.352 
 
-20.351 
 
-0.05 
 
0.55 
 
-2.63*** 
 
-2.69*** 
Acquisition volume of VC-backed targets 
(normalized by firm size) 0.010 
 
0.015 
 
0.019 
 
-0.008 
 
1.49 
 
0.81 
 
1.92* 
 
-0.38 
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Number of joint ventures with VC-backed 
firms 0.365 
 
1.567 
 
0.205 
 
-0.069 
 
0.68 
 
1.49 
 
0.61 
 
-0.15 
Number of strategic alliances with VC-
backed firms -0.047 
 
0.135 
 
0.054 
 
0.217 
 
-0.76 
 
1.05 
 
1.15 
 
1.79* 
Sales growth 0.104 
 
0.228 
 
-0.179 
 
-0.133 
 
0.36 
 
0.39 
 
-0.48 
 
-0.35 
Stock return 0.029 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.053 
 
0.037 
 
0.18 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.32 
 
0.42 
        Firm Fixed Effects No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0670 
 
0.0913 
 
0.1302 
 
0.2016 
Sample Size 5212   884   4510   912 
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Figure 1. Number of sample firms over time 
 
This figure shows the number of public firms available in the IRRC database from 1998 to 2006 excluding 
utility companies and financial companies. The firms are split into four groups according to the number of 
VC directors on board. Directors who are partners or executives of a venture capital firm are denoted as VC 
directors. 
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Figure 2. Tobin’s Q, R&D and CAPEX 
 
This figure shows Tobin’s Q, R&D and CAPEX (both given as a percentage of market value of assets 
(MVA)) as a function of the number of VC directors on board for our sample of public firms. 
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